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Quantum key distribution (QKD) and quantum communication enable the secure exchange of infor-
mation between remote parties. Currently, the distributed-phase-reference (DPR) protocols, which
are based on weak coherent pulses, are among the most practical solutions for long-range QKD. Dur-
ing the last 10 years, long-distance fiber-based DPR systems have been successfully demonstrated,
although fundamental obstacles such as intrinsic channel losses limit their performance. Here, we
introduce the first two-dimensional DPR-QKD protocol in which information is encoded in the time
and phase of weak coherent pulses. The ability of extracting two bits of information per detection
event, enables a higher secret key rate in specific realistic network scenarios. Moreover, despite the
use of more dimensions, the proposed protocol remains simple, practical, and fully integrable.
INTRODUCTION
Sharing sensitive information has always been a great
challenge within our society. In particular, QKD, first
introduced by Bennett and Brassard, provides a unique
procedure for exchanging a private key, based on the laws
of quantum mechanics [1]. During the last decade, the
effort from the scientific community has been focused on
an enhancement of the quantum communication perfor-
mances in terms of key rate, transmission distance and
security aspects [2–8]. In later years this technology
has matured enormously, but the lack of compact, ef-
ficient, inexpensive, and reliable systems, has restricted
wide spreading of practical QKD systems.
The basic idea behind QKD systems, in the case of "pre-
pare and measure" schemes, is based on quantum states
prepared by Alice (the transmitter) and sent through a
quantum channel towards Bob (the receiver). Depend-
ing on the quantum measurement, Bob can deduce which
state was prepared by Alice. This way, after error recon-
ciliation and privacy amplification methods established
in a classical channel, the two users share an identical
bit sequence. Ideally, QKD systems are secure with no
chance for an eavesdropper to extract information on the
key. However, in real implementations of the systems,
due to the losses and imperfections of devices, the secret
key rate defines a bound on how much information can
be assumed secure [9–11].
We here propose a new QKD protocol, which we refer to
by the name: Differential phase time shifting (DPTS). In
its essence, the protocol utilizes two degrees of freedom
— time and phase — to encode information in a quar-
ternary alphabet, i.e. {0, 1, 2, 3}[12]. The DPTS belongs
to the family of distributed phase-reference (DPR) pro-
tocols, which rather than using the principle of random
basis-choices between different mutually unbiased bases,
encodes information in adjacent weak coherent pulses
[9, 13, 14]. We study the performance of the DPTS pro-
tocol using infinite-key analysis in the case of collective
attacks, and further show that the protocol holds great
potential in intracity network scenarios.
RESULTS
Principle of DPTS
As in most practical implementations of QKD, the
DPTS protocol, which is sketched in Fig. 1, uses a source
of weak coherent pulses to establish a key of random num-
bers between two authenticated parties, Alice and Bob.
To initiate the key distribution process, Alice randomly
encodes information in the train of pulses in two dimen-
sions, time and phase. The time encoding is performed
using an intensity modulator (IM) as in the coherent-one
way (COW) protocol [14]. For every pair of pulses (we
refer to such a pair as a sub-block), one pulse is trans-
mitted with mean photon number µ < 1 (|α〉), and one
is blocked completely (|vac〉). Hence, within each sub-
block, information is carried by the time-of-arrival of a
non-empty pulse [14]. The phase encoding is performed
using a phase modulator (PM), where a random phase
between sub-blocks is either {0, pi}. By combining the
effect of the IM and the PM, Alice prepares states from
the quaternary alphabet:
|0〉 = | ± α〉|vac〉| ± α〉|vac〉,
|1〉 = | ± α〉|vac〉| ∓ α〉|vac〉,
|2〉 = |vac〉| ± α〉|vac〉| ± α〉,
|3〉 = |vac〉| ± α〉|vac〉| ∓ α〉.
(1)
Bob may distinguish unambiguously between these states
by employing an unbalanced interferometer which inter-
feres adjacent sub-blocks separated by T = 2/ν, where ν
is the laser repetition rate.
It is important to note that, analogous to the
differential phase shift (DPS) protocol, each sub-
block may participate in defining up to two states
[13]. For instance, the sequence: |α〉|vac〉, | −
α〉|vac〉, | − α〉|vac〉, |vac〉|α〉, |vac〉|α〉 encodes the states:
|1〉, |0〉,−, |2〉. Here, the ’−’ indicates a change of the
temporal sequence over the sub-block separation, in
which case Bob is not able to interfere the non-empty
2FIG. 1. Basic scheme of the DPTS protocol. A train of weak coherent pulses (WCP) is emitted by a laser of repetition rate
ν (2/T ), and attenuated to the single photon level. A phase modulator (PM) encodes the first key bit in non adjacent pulses
choosing a random phase between 0 and pi. An intensity modulator (IM), exploiting two different time positions, encodes the
second key bit by randomly choosing between the time instances |±α〉|vac〉 or |vac〉|±α〉. The length of the block (N), in which
the IM uses the same time sequence, is defined by Alice who randomly decides between different duration (N ≥ 4). In this
way Alice prepares a sequence of different states: |0〉, |1〉, |2〉, |3〉. A random decoy sequence is implemented in order to check
the coherence between pulses. Using a delay line interferometer (T delay between arms), the receiver, Bob, can simultaneously
measure the phase and the time of arrivals of the photons.
pulses in his interferometer. Therefore, to minimize the
number of unused sub-blocks (or measurements), Alice
may benefit from repeating the temporal encoding over
long pulse sequences (i.e. only using |0〉 and |1〉, or |2〉
and |3〉 for long intervals). However, doing so permits a
potential eavesdropper, Eve, to gain partial information
on a given state by measuring the time-of-arrival of pulses
in adjacent sub-blocks. To take into account this possi-
bility, Alice prepares blocks of length N , within which
the temporal sequence of empty and non-empty pulses
is the same. The value of N , counting both empty and
non-empty pulses, is for each block chosen randomly in
a uniform distribution: N ∈ {4, 6, ...Nmax}. This mod-
ification means that both Bob and Eve are essentially
unaware of the positions of the block separations, and,
whereas this is of no importance to Bob, it is fundamental
for Eve.
The security of DPTS relies on the same principle as
other DPR protocols: the coherence between non-empty
pulses [15, 16]. Eve can not perform a measurement on
any finite number of states without at some point break-
ing coherence between successive pulses. This is specifi-
cally true for the DPTS protocol since Eve is completely
ignorant about the start and end of blocks (note that
coherence is not carried across a block separation cor-
responding to two sub-blocks of different temporal se-
quences). However, since coherence is distributed across
sub-block separations whereas the temporal information
lies within sub-blocks, a sophisticated Eve can address
each sub-block separately trying to just learn the time-of-
arrival information (i.e. is a state |0〉, |1〉 or is it |2〉, |3〉).
Doing so, she only breaks coherence within sub-blocks,
and thus Bob, who only checks coherence across sub-
blocks, is not able to reveal her presence. To counter this
attack, Alice introduces decoy sequences with probability
pdecoy ≪ 1 [15], in which blocks consist of N non-empty
pulses. Interestingly, this decoy is just a DPS sequence
in which the phase encoding is carried between every sec-
ond pulse (as measured by Bob). Consequently, if Eve
probes one or more sub-blocks containing two non-empty
pulses, she inevitably disturbs the phase relation between
these pulses [10]. As a result, there are cases where Eve
introduces phase errors into the communication.
Protocol definition
We now describe in detail how Alice and Bob establish
a common key using the DPTS protocol:
• Alice prepares states for transmission in the quan-
tum channel using her phase- and intensity mod-
ulators. We assume that Alice chooses equally
and randomly between the four different states
{0, 1, 2, 3}. The temporal sequence is repeated
within each block of random length (N ≥ 4),
whereas the phase difference between each sub-
block is changed randomly between {0, pi}.
• Once Bob has received a photon in one of the two
detectors, he reveals over a public classical chan-
nel the sub-time (the number of the sub-block) in-
stances of his recorded detection events.
• Alice reports back by telling which of the events
corresponded to an overlap between adjacent blocks
with opposite temporal sequence (a block separa-
tion was present in that instance). Bob must dis-
card these events.
3• For each of the remaining detection events, Alice
and Bob establish two bits of information for their
key: Alice easily figures out the detection time
from her sent temporal sequence, and infers from
her phase encoding which detector clicked at Bob’s
side.
• After estimating the quantum bit error rate
(QBER), Alice and Bob perform standard error
reconciliation and privacy amplification [17–19]. At
the end of the process Alice and Bob share secure
identical keys.
Secret key rate
To further describe the proposed protocol, let us consider
the maximum extractable secret key rate Rsk [10]. For
the DPTS protocol this quantity reads
Rsk = fRB [IAB −min(IAE , IBE)], (2)
where RB = R + 4pd(1 − R) is the total detection rate
with R = [1− exp(−µtηd)] /2. µ is the mean photon
number of non-empty pulses, t represents the quantum
channel transmission coefficient, ηd is the (common) de-
tector efficiency, and pd is the dark count probability.
The pre-factor f = (1− pdecoy) (〈N〉 − 1) / 〈N〉, where
〈N〉 is the average block length, takes into account the
fraction of Bob’s detection events that is assigned to the
key string. The unused fraction 1/ 〈N〉 is due to de-
tections associated with adjacent sub-blocks of different
temporal sequences. In these cases, the clicks are ran-
domly distributed between the two detectors, and so the
instances are discarded.
The mutual information between Alice and Bob, is
expressed in terms of the Shannon entropy as IAB =
H(A) − H(A|B) [20]. Alice has a total of four differ-
ent states to choose from, and by assuming that she
prepares each state with equal probability, one finds
H(A) = −∑4i=1(1/4) log4(1/4) = 1. Note that we, for
convenience, measure information using a base-4 loga-
rithm rather than the common base 2 [in units of bits
one acquires H(A) = 2]. Furthermore, the conditional
entropy H(A|B) is expressed as
H(A|B) = S4
(
1− e(1)r
)
+
4∑
i=2
S4
(
e(i)r
)
, (3)
with S4(x) ≡ −x log4 x , and where the four error prob-
abilities are given as
e(1)r =
R 1−V2 + 3pd(1−R)
RB
,
e(2)r =
R 1−V2 + pd(1−R)
RB
,
e(3)r = e
(4)
r =
pd(1 −R)
RB
,
(4)
where V = (pD1−pD2)/(pD1+pD2) represents the visibil-
ity of the interferometer used by Bob and pD1 (pD2) rep-
resents the probability of detection in detector D1 (D2).
Note that, in the definition of the error probabilities, the
visibility appears in only two of the four terms, since an
interferometer error does not alter the time of arrival. As
a result, the DPTS protocol is less effected by interferom-
eter mismatches as compared to the DPS protocol. On
the other hand, the higher dimensionality of the DPTS
protocol renders it more vulnerable to dark counts (one
dark click produces two errors on the key), effectively
limiting its use at long communication distances.
In order to evaluate the achievable secret key rate for
Alice and Bob, we next introduce an upper bound on the
information that a potential eavesdropper might obtain
by performing the most basic attack; the beam-splitting
attack. A complete analysis would concentrate on IBE
since Eve is clueless about detection events resulting from
imperfections at Bob’s side [see Eq. (2)]. However, as
a first attempt to estimate her information, we restrict
ourselves to the more simple analysis of IAE .
Security analysis
This section presents an analysis of security based on
the collective beam-splitting attack (BSA) and follows
the method used in [21] for the DPS and COW protocols.
In the BSA, Eve replaces the quantum channel connect-
ing Alice and Bob by a lossless line. Using a beam-splitter
to simulate the losses of the quantum channel, Eve ac-
quires 1−t of the signal without disturbing the state sent
by Alice. Thus, the BSA belongs to the family of zero-
error attacks, and is therefore undetectable by Alice and
Bob. The states prepared by Alice consist of sequences⊗
k|αk〉 with αk ∈ {+α, 0,−α}, so by performing the
BSA, Eve receives states of the form
⊗
k|α(E)k 〉, where
α
(E)
k ∈ {+αE , 0,−αE} with αE = α
√
1− t.
At this point we assume that Eve stores the states in
her quantum memory for measurement after Bob reveals
his detection events. Indeed, for such a collective attack,
the maximum information she may extract is given by the
Holevo quantity (which must be maximized with respect
to the strategies available to Eve, though here we only
consider the BSA) [10, 22]
χAE = S (ρE)−
∑
j
pjS
(
ρE|j .
)
(5)
Here S is the von Neumann entropy, ρE =
∑
j pjρE|j,
pj is the probability of Alice preparing the four states
j ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}, and ρE|j is Eve’s state conditioned on
preparation of state j. As mentioned earlier, we consider
only the balanced situation where Alice prepares each
state with a probability pj = 1/4. In the current pro-
tocol each value in the quaternary alphabet is encoded
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FIG. 2. Secret key rate per pulse. Performance versus a)
distance in the case of fixed visibility, V = 0.9, and b) vis-
ibility at a channel length of L = 100 km. For each of the
three protocols, an optimization was performed with respect
to the mean photon number µ (see supplementary material).
Parameters: ηd = 0.1, pd = 10
−7, αloss = 0.2 dB/km, and
pdecoy=0.02 for COW and DPTS.
in four consecutive pulses. It follows that Eve’s states
conditioned on Alice’s preparation are
ρE|0 =
1
2
(P+αE ,vac,+αE ,vac + P−αE ,vac,−αE ,vac) ,
ρE|1 =
1
2
(P+αE ,vac,−αE ,vac + P−αE ,vac,+αE ,vac) ,
ρE|2 =
1
2
(Pvac,+αE ,vac,+αE + Pvac,−αE ,vac,−αE ) ,
ρE|3 =
1
2
(Pvac,+αE ,vac,−αE + Pvac,−αE ,vac,+αE ) ,
(6)
where Px is the projection operator. To calculate the
maximum accessible information for Eve, it is helpful to
define γ = e−|αE |
2
. By this convention the overlaps be-
tween states can be written as |〈+αE , vac,+αE , vac| −
αE , vac,−αE , vac||〉 = γ4, and |〈j|k||〉 = γ2 for j 6= k,
where j, k ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}. From this, the Holevo quantity
[Eq. (5)] becomes
χ
(0)
AE =−
(1 + γ2)2 + (2γ)2
8
log4
[
(1 + γ2)2 + (2γ)2
8
]
− 3
(
1− γ2)2
8
log4
[(
1− γ2)2
8
]
− 1− γ
4
2
log4
(
1− γ4
8
)
+ h4
(
1− γ4
2
)
.
(7)
where S4 is defined below Eq. (3), and h4(x) = S4(x) +
S4(1 − x). Equation (7) presents an upper bound on
the information Eve can obtain by trying to distinguish
between the four different states. However, Eve can do
better than this by trying to establish partial information
about the state Alice and Bob agreed upon. Specifically,
by performing measurements on the sub-blocks which are
temporally adjacent to the time slots in which Alice and
Bob agreed on the bit pairs, Eve may with some proba-
bility infer that the state was either of the pairs |0〉, |1〉
or |2〉, |3〉 (in this case, Eve has no way of knowing the
phase-related bit). Since this additional attack by Eve
is conditioned on her not getting a conclusive result in
the primary measurement, the corrected Holevo quantity
becomes
χAE = χ
(0)
AE + (1− χ(0)AE) χ(1)AE , (8)
where χ
(1)
AE is derived and given in the supplementary
material. Note however, that Eve is essentially ignorant
about the position of block separations. Therefore mak-
ing conclusions from this secondary attack will result in
errors for Eve.
Numerical results
Combining the results of the previous sections [in par-
ticular Eqs. (2), (4), and (8)] enables us to plot a first
upper bound on the secret key rate under the assump-
tion of collective attacks. Specifically, Fig. 2 shows Rsk
versus communication distance at the optimized values of
the mean photon number µ. To assess the performance
of the DPTS protocol, we have included plots for both
COW and DPS. In comparison, the DPTS protocol has
a similar performance as the other protocols under the
realistic condition of non-ideal visibilities (as examples
we have used V = 0.9 and V = 0.95). Noteworthy, the
DPTS protocol displays a less critical dependence on the
visibility when compared to the DPS protocol.
In a more realistic situation, the comparison of the pro-
tocols must take into account the detector dead times.
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FIG. 3. Secret key rate in real case scenario. Different secret
key rates achievable in a medium-length link scenario, where
the detector dead times play an important role. We use mean
photon numbers for the different protocols of µDPTS = 0.23,
µDPS = 0.19, and µCOW = 0.52, at repetition rate ν = 10 ·
10
9
Hz, and fixed block length of N = 4. The detectors are
specified by dark-count probability pd = 3.5 · 10
−9, a dead
time of td = 1 · 10
−6
s, and efficiency ηd = 0.1. We assume
V = 1, and a decoy-sequence probability of pdecoy = 0.02 for
COW and DPTS.
For example, considering the case of commercial InGaAs
infrared single-photon detectors (the most used in fiber
links and the most promising thanks to the non-cryogenic
requirement), they generally exhibit a dead time in ex-
cess of 1 µs [23, 24]. Thus, in any scenario where the
detector dead time significantly influences the key gener-
ation rate, the ability to extract two bits of information
per detection event grants the DPTS protocol an advan-
tage. To illustrate this effect, Fig. 3 shows an example
of the secret key rate in bits s−1, after inclusion of the
dead-time dependency.
DISCUSSION
The main figure of merit in a QKD system is the achiev-
able secret key rate. Therefore, to asses the performance
of DPTS, Fig. 2 displays this quantity for DPTS in com-
parison with the standard COW and DPS protocols. Ev-
idently, the comparison shows very similar behavior of
the three DPR protocols. Considering more specifically
the case of DPTS, the final key rate is influenced by the
length of the blocks N prepared by Alice. Even though
a higher value of N allows an increased sifted key rate, it
is necessary to consider a trade-off between the length of
blocks and the information leakage to Eve. In the case of
long-distance links (in excess of 100 km), the behavior of
the three protocols is maintained, but as the DPTS proto-
col is more severely influenced by dark count events, it is
generally limited to shorter distances. On the other hand,
as seen by comparing the subfigures of Fig. 2, the DPTS
protocol is less dependent on the interferometer visibil-
ity. This fact permits the proposed protocol to achieve
a more stable secret key generation rate in comparison
with the DPS protocol. In implementing a QKD proto-
col, it is necessary to consider the limitations set by the
optical and electronic devices [25–27]. An important ex-
ample is the single-photon detector dead time td, which
sets an upper limit on the key generation rate. This pa-
rameter is important in a short- or medium-length link
scenario, where the average wait time between detection
events is of the same order of magnitude as td (which
is typically on the order of microseconds). In Fig. 3, it
is shown that DPTS may achieve a significant increase
in the secure key rate at distances where the detector
dead time is a limiting factor. This potential arises due
to the ability of the DPTS protocol to extract two bits
of information per detection event. The use of multiple
degrees of freedom in transmission of information, intu-
itively increases the complexity of the scheme in compar-
ison with protocols dealing with each individual degree
of freedom. Despite DPTS not being an exception to this
rule of thumb, the complexity overhead in comparison to
DPS or COW is not crucial. On the other hand, DPTS
does exhibit two significant practical advantages. Firstly,
the COW protocol requires a monitoring line to check for
the presence of an eavesdropper. However, such a moni-
toring line is unnecessary for DPTS, as an interferometer
is directly used in the data line, and hence implements
the necessary coherence check. Thus, the decrease in
rate related to monitoring of the data line in COW, is
not a limitation for DPTS. Secondly, the stability of the
interferometer over time, is a considerable challenge in
implementations of the DPS protocol in non-stable en-
vironments. The performance of the DPTS protocol is
inherently more resilient against fluctuating interferom-
eter visibilities, because the temporal bit remains unaf-
fected by such inefficiencies. This entails, that DPTS
might be better suited in cases where it is difficult to
maintain the interferometer visibility above a certain re-
quired operation threshold. Finally, DPTS can poten-
tially play an important role in QKD networks spanning
from metropolitan to intercity distances [28–30]. Inter-
estingly, the required measurement apparatus is identical
to the one used in DPS, and in fact, the receiver does not
need to know a priori whether the signals arise from a
DPS or a DPTS encoding. This compatibility suggests
that a versatile network encompassing the use of both
the DPS and DPTS protocols is feasible.
In conclusion, we have proposed a novel kind of
distributed-phase-reference protocol for quantum key dis-
tribution. Utilizing both the time- and phase degrees of
freedom, this protocol provides a significant step towards
6realization of fast, reliable, and practical quantum com-
munication. Future directions include a finite-key analy-
sis and a real-time field implementation.
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7ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
Eve’s additional attack
We here explore an additional (or secondary) attack op-
tion which is available to Eve when performing the beam-
splitting attack (BSA). The possibility of this additional
attack, arises as Alice repeats the temporal sequence
(i.e. non-empty, empty or empty, non-empty) within each
block of length N . To clarify, assume that Bob has a de-
tection event in a certain time slot. Eve, wanting to know
which state Alice prepared for Bob, extracts the corre-
sponding 4-pulse state from her quantum memory, and
tries to determine whether it was |0〉, |1〉, |2〉 or |3〉 (See
Main Text, Security analysis). Often, Eve has an incon-
clusive measurement and the state of the 4-pulse system
is destroyed. However, in these cases, she can extract an
adjacent 2-pulse state from her quantum memory, and
try to learn its temporal encoding (i.e. is it |0〉, |1〉 or
|2〉, |3〉), which is worth 1 bit of information. Unfortu-
nately for Eve, this bit will not always be correct: In
some cases she extracts a 2-pulse state belonging to an
adjacent block of the opposite temporal encoding. And,
essentially for the protocol, she does not know when this
is the case due to the randomized block length.
The probability of a correct bit for Eve pE , depends
on the average block size 〈N〉, and can found to satisfy
(assuming a negligible fraction of decoy sequences)
pE =
〈N〉 − 2
〈N〉 − 1 , 〈N〉 ≥ 4, (9)
which tends towards unity for 〈N〉 ≫ 4 as intuitively
expected. Since the nature of the errors are identical
to those of a binary symmetric channel (BSC), we can
explicitly express the correction term in Eq. (8) as
χ
(1)
AE =
1
2
[
1− h2 (pE)
][
S4
(
1 + 3γ2
4
)
+3S4
(
1− γ2
4
)
− h4
(
1− γ2
2
)]
.
(10)
The pre-factor of 1/2 enters since this attack only gives
half of the state information, the factor 1 − h2 (pE) is
the BSC capacity, and finally the three terms in the
last square bracket results from analyzing how well Eve
can discriminate unambiguously between the two dif-
ferent temporal sequences. Note that this is not iden-
tical to the expression for the coherent-one-way pro-
tocol (see [21]), since Eve’s conditioned states in our
case are: ρE|vac = (P+αE ,vac + P−αE ,vac)/2 and ρE|1 =
(Pvac,+αE + Pvac,−αE )/2.
The corrected Holevo bound presented in this section
only takes into account a single additional measurement
performed by Eve. In principle, this measurement may be
inconclusive in which case she can extract a new 2-pulse
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state and perform a new measurement. Thus, a more
accurate analysis does exist, but is considered outside
the scope of this paper as it is not expected to have a
crucial impact on the bound for 〈N〉 ≤ 8.
Mean photon number parametrization
The secret key rate Rsk in Eq. (2) indicates that one
should always try to optimize IAB−min (IAE , IAB) with
respect to the free variables available. For a given trans-
mission link, an obvious parameter to optimize is the
mean photon number per pulse µ. In general, Bob’s de-
tection rate increases with µ, but so does Eve’s proba-
bility of measuring the corresponding state. Thus, for a
specific setup (QKD protocol, transmission channel, in-
terferometer, detectors, etc.), it is expected that an op-
timal value, µopt, exists. As an example, Fig. 1 shows
the behavior of µopt versus transmission distance. These
values were, for each transmission distance, obtained by
numerically finding the value µopt, which optimized Rsk
[which is then shown in Fig. 2]. As the DPTS proto-
col forces a potential to distinguish both between states
|+ α〉, | − α〉 (as in DPS) and | ± α〉, |vac〉 (as in COW)
it is perhaps not surprising that the optimal value µopt
for the DPTS protocol lies somewhere in between the
corresponding optimal values for DPS and COW.
